14 Feb 2025

Hacker Probing For WordPress Plugin With Many Vulnerabilities That Wordfence and Other Providers Incorrectly Claimed Were Fixed Last Year

Today we saw what appeared to be a hacker probing for usage of the WordPress plugin WP Compress on our websites. The probing was done by requesting a file from the plugin if the plugin had existed on our website, /wp-content/plugins/wp-compress-image-optimizer/readme.txt. We don’t use that plugin on that website or any of them. So what might explain a hacker’s interest in the plugin? Last year the WordPress security provider Wordfence claimed that a vulnerability had been fixed in the plugin, of a type that sounds like it could explain a hacker’s interest. Here is part of their description:

This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level permissions and above, to edit plugin settings, including storing cross-site scripting, in multisite environments. [Read more]

4 Feb 2025

Patchstack Isn’t Actually Patching Vulnerabilities

You would reasonably think that a security company named Patchstack would be focused on patching security vulnerabilities, but it turns out they are not. In fact, they are actually making it harder for vulnerabilities to get patched.

If you head over to Patchstack’s homepage, they currently claim at the top of the page to offer the “fastest protection for WordPress security vulnerabilities” and claim to have
9,100+ virtual patches to protect you:” [Read more]

31 Jan 2025

WordPress (and Open Source In General) Have a Big Problem With a Lack of Vulnerability Transparency

Looking back at some things while preparing a post about a WordPress security provider misleading people about the European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act, we ran across a letter that was put out by WordPress and several other open source CMS. In that they made this claim about fixing potential vulnerabilities in open source code:

Tens of thousands of developers are empowered to identify and fix potential vulnerabilities, because all FOSS code is made publicly available — unlike proprietary software code that is kept secret. [Read more]

31 Jan 2025

Patchstack Admits to Failing to Basic Due Diligence With Vulnerability Reports, Which Leads to Vulnerabilities Remaining Unfixed

Last May, we looked into a claim from Automattic’s WPScan that a vulnerability in the 400,000+ install WordPress plugin Kadence Blocks had been fixed in its implementation of WordPress blocks. They provided little information and didn’t show any evidence the issue had been resolved. There was the further problem that the changelog for the version they claimed the issue was fixed in had no mention of a security fix. We did find the proof of concept they provided stopped working in that version. But we also found that there was plenty of code related to the issue that was still not properly secured. We confirmed that at least one instance was still vulnerable.

Before warning our customers about that, we attempted to work with the developer, StellarWP, to address that. On the website of their Kadence brand, there is a page on responsible disclosure that starts this way (emphasis ours): [Read more]

29 Jan 2025

WordPress Plugin Developers Directing Vulnerabilities Reports To Patchstack Doesn’t Signal They Take Security Seriously

Earlier in the week, we talked about how the developers of a security solution were failing to show the WordPress community (and their wider audience) that their scores were providing a meaningful and useful measure of security. We also talked about a WordPress security provider, Patchstack, was once again being dishonest. While preparing that latter post, we noticed they made this case for plugin developers having vulnerability reports directed away from them to Patchstack:

Having a VDP security program is a signal to your users that you take security seriously and your software is trustworthy. [Read more]

27 Jan 2025

Patchstack Apparently Didn’t Take Basic Step to Get Unfixed Exploitable Vulnerabilities Fixed Before Disclosing Them

Last week WordPress security provider Patchstack disclosed what they claimed was an unfixed exploitable vulnerability in a WordPress theme and one in a related WordPress plugin. We say claim, because some of the information they provided appeared on its face to be very wrong. Early in the post, they wrote that “code that handles user input didn’t have any authorization or nonce check.” Code that handles user input doesn’t necessarily require authorization or a nonce check. For example, doing a search on a WordPress based website doesn’t require either of those things, despite involving user input. A more salient point is they then promptly showed the code and that not only contained a nonce check, but even had a comment about it, “First check the nonce, if it fails the function will break:”

[Read more]

27 Jan 2025

Patchstacks’s Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) Goes Against Important Requirements of EU’s Cyber Resilience Act

In October, the European Union approved the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) after two years of development. It seems well thought out, probably best shown with the authors understanding the harm that security providers’ own bad security often creates. Unfortunately, in the run up to passage, WordPress and others had tried to portray it as having negative effects on open source software (while also providing a misleading portrayal of security handling at WordPress). That is, despite it actually requiring for-profits entities taking advantage of open source software being required to help secure it. Also, unfortunately, an unscrupulous WordPress security provider is trying to mislead the WordPress community as what the act entails to continue harmfully directing vulnerability reporting away from developers.

That provider being Patchstack, here is how it mentions complying with the CRA through them on a page on its website about their vulnerability disclosure program (VDP): [Read more]

22 Jan 2025

Plugin That Patchstack Is Claimed to Ensure Is Secure Contains an Additional Outdated Known Insecure Library

Last week we talked about two popular WordPress plugins that had been run through our Plugin Security Scorecard and identified as containing a rather out of date version of third-party libraries, which according to the libraries developers, contained a security issue. The libraries in question were different in the plugins, but it turns out they also have another library in common, where they are both using outdated known insecure versions. One of those is the 1+ million install SVG Support, where someone reported to the developer at the end of October that it was also using an outdated and known insecure version of the library DOMPurify. There still hasn’t been an update to the plugin to address that. More people have been reporting that issue. After seeing that, we started looking in to adding a check for DOMPurify to our Plugin Security Checker. Through that, we found a couple of fairly popular plugins are also still using older versions that the developer of the library is insecure.

We contacted the developer of one of those yesterday to let them know about the problem. The version they are using is subject to issues that were publicly disclosed by the developer of the library in September and October. There are not any topics on the support forum for the plugin about that, which is interesting considering the other plugin had multiple people reported it to the developer. [Read more]

16 Dec 2024

Wordfence and WPScan Falsely Claim Closed WordPress Plugin Contains Serious Vulnerability

We are currently looking in to yet another problem with handling of security by Awesome Motive and the Security Reviewer from the WordPress Plugin Review Team. In doing that, we ran across another example of the incredible sloppy work done by prominent providers of data on vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins.

In January, the WordPress plugin SimpleMap Store Locator was closed on the WordPress Plugin Directory for an unspecified “security issue.” [Read more]